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financial innovation and regulatory responses to these risks, (ii) the effect of finance and 
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1. Introduction 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-9 and the on-going Eurozone crisis have shed doubts on 
the role of financial institutions and markets in modern market economies. There is not only a 
fundamental debate on the function and optimal size of financial systems in post-crisis 
economies, but also on their structure. Questions are raised on the role of financial 
innovation, the benefits and risks of financial globalization, and the role of government in the 
financial sector. The crisis has also sparked a regulatory reform process, which has led to 
tighter capital and liquidity requirements, with other dimensions, including activity 
restrictions and taxation, still being discussed.  
 
This special issue comprises several papers addressing specific questions related to the 
Global Financial Crisis and the on-going regulatory reform process. Specifically, papers in 
this special issue discuss the benefits and risks of financial innovation, including CDS 
protection and securitization, and regulatory frameworks for them; the impact of finance and 
globalization on real sector outcomes; and the role of government in providing credit 
guarantees.  The special issue contains both theoretical and empirical papers, reflecting 
advances in both areas for better understanding the relationship between financial innovation 
and deepening and economic growth and stability, as well as the role of regulation and of the 
government in the financial sector, in general.  
 
The pre-crisis consensus was that market-based finance can only be good and that the 
expansion of the financial system, triggered by technological advances and deregulation, 
bears high upsides with little downside risk. However, even the pre-crisis literature 
documented that while the level of financial depth is positively associated with economic 
growth, rapid growth in credit is a reliable crisis predictor (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 
2005; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). And while financial innovation has contributed to the 
rapid expansion of financial systems around the world, with important benefits for 
households and enterprises, this expansion has also created new risks, most importantly tail 
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risks not taken into account by individual investors (Rajan, 2005).  The financial crisis has 
helped swing the pendulum towards a rather negative view of the financial system, 
overemphasizing the risks of financial innovation and financial markets, in general, and 
calling for strong regulatory responses. Frustration about taxpayer financed bail-outs and the 
high economic cost of the recent crises has been channeled into calls for restraining if not 
downsizing the financial system. 
 
If there is one major lesson coming out of the very different papers and out of the more recent 
literature on financial institutions and markets in general, it is that finance can be as much a 
force for economic development as the root cause of systemic crises. Often the same 
mechanism that helps overcome agency problems and improve resource allocation can be a 
source of fragility. It might be thus difficult for the financial system to settle for the 
Goldilocks level of financial depth, neither too cold nor too hot. While financial deepening 
requires risk taking and risk transformation, agency problems, herding trends, and self-
enforcing cycles push market participants to take on more risks than sustainable, effectively 
shifting risk, which ultimately results in financial fragility (e.g., Acharya, 2009). The 
objective of achieving the ideal level of financial depth thus requires focusing on the 
incentives of all market participants and thus ultimately the regulatory framework.  Critically, 
however, this and related research suggests that the challenge is not so much to restrain 
finance, but rather to harness it for the benefit of the real economy.  
 
Incentives of key players in the financial system are important, including those of investors, 
borrowers, regulators and politicians.  The challenge for the regulatory reform process, 
currently under way on both sides of the Atlantic, is thus to structure incentives in a way that 
private and social benefits and risks of market participants are aligned. To be more specific, 
the downside risks with potential losses of risk-taking decisions by financial institutions and 
market participants have to be internalized. This requires adjustments to both micro- and 
macro-prudential regulatory frameworks and a dynamic approach that adapts to new 
structures and risks in the financial system.    However, this reform process also has to take 
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into account that regulators are not benevolent social planners, but face their own set of 
incentives and constraints (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2012).  
 
While the regulatory reform discussion and debate on the future structure of the financial 
system often focuses on high-income countries in North America and Europe, the papers in 
this special issue make clear that the repercussions of this discussion affect financial systems 
as much in the emerging and developing world. Given the strong evidence of the positive 
transformational effects of finance, including global finance, on economies in the developing 
and emerging world, even taking into account the risks of rapid deepening or opening up, the 
challenge is to develop institutional and regulatory frameworks that allow harnessing the 
potential benefits of financial deepening, rather than restraining it.  
 
The remainder of this introductory article is structured as follows.  The next section discusses 
research on different forms of financial innovation, including their benefits and risks for 
credit markets and regulatory implications.  Section 3 presents recent evidence on the effect 
of financial development and globalization on real economy outcomes. Section 4 offers a 
critical view of the role of governments in the financial sector. Section 5 concludes with a 
forward-looking view on the future research agenda. While I will discuss each of the papers 
in the special issue, I will not go into detail, but rather invite the readers to explore the papers. 
 
2. Financial innovation – the bright and dark sides 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2009 has spurred widespread debates on the “bright” 
and “dark” sides of financial innovation.   The traditional innovation-growth view posits that 
financial innovations help reduce agency costs, facilitate risk sharing, complete the market, 
and ultimately improve allocative efficiency and economic growth.  The innovation-fragility 
view, by contrast, has identified financial innovations as the root cause of the recent Global 
Financial Crisis, by leading to an unprecedented credit expansion fueling a boom-bust cycle 
in housing prices, by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected 
risks, and by helping banks and investment banks design structured products to exploit 
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investors’ misunderstandings of financial markets and exploit regulatory arbitrage 
possibilities. 
 
A series of recent theoretical and empirical papers have addressed the benefits and risks of 
financial innovation. To quote just a few examples, Laeven, Levine and Michalopoulos 
(2009) show that financial innovation has been a driving force behind financial deepening 
and economic development over the past centuries, as the emergence of specialized lenders 
and investment banks to finance railroad expansion in the 19th century, the emergence of 
venture capital firms to finance high-technology firms in the 20th century, and the financing 
of biotech firms through pharmaceutical companies in the 21st century show. Beck et al. 
(2012) show that financial innovation allows economies to better exploit growth 
opportunities and helps especially industries relying on external finance and R&D.   Dynan, 
Elmendorf, and Sichel (2006) suggest that financial innovation has played a key role in 
reducing the volatility of economic activity in the early parts of the 21st century.  Focusing on 
a specific form of financial innovation, Norden, Silva Buston, and Wagner (2013) show that 
banks with larger gross positions in credit derivatives charge significantly lower corporate 
loan spreads.  
 
On the other hand, several recent papers have focused on the negative aspects of financial 
innovation. Wagner (2007a, b) shows that financial innovation that reduces asymmetric 
information can actually increase risk-taking due to agency problems between bank owners 
and managers, or because of lower costs of fragility. Ashcraft and Santos (2009) confirm this 
hypothesis, showing that firms with high default risk face higher loan spreads after they 
become traded in the CDS market, an effect that might be driven by reduced incentives for 
banks to monitor these borrowers. Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2012) use a theoretical 
model to show how financial institutions can cater to risk-averse investors’ preferences by 
engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks, ultimately leading 
to fragility when these risks are exposed.  Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2012a), Mian and 
Sufi (2009), and Keys et al. (2010) show empirically that securitization resulted in reduced 
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lending standards in the U.S. in the early 2000s in the run-up to the crisis and increased loan 
delinquency rates. Beck et al. (2012) show for a cross-section of countries that higher 
financial innovation is associated with higher risk-taking and more volatile returns of banks 
and resulted in higher bank losses during the crisis. 
 
This special issue contains three theoretical papers that gauge the design and effect of specific 
forms of financial innovation. First, Arping (2013) focuses on protection of lenders against 
default risk through CDS protection and shows that the use of this instrument can have both 
positive and negative repercussions for credit market efficiency.  Specifically, Arping embeds 
CDS protection into a model of corporate lending with borrower moral hazard and derives 
implications for credit market efficiency. On the one hand, credit default swaps insulate 
lenders against losses from forcing borrowers into default and liquidation. This improves the 
credibility of termination threats, which can have positive implications for borrower 
incentives and credit availability ex ante. On the other hand, lenders may abuse their 
enhanced bargaining power vis-a-vis borrowers and extract excessive rents in debt 
renegotiations. Arping shows that if this hold-up threat becomes severe, borrowers will be 
reluctant to agree to debt maturity designs or control rights transfers that would have been 
optimal in the absence of CDS protection. The introduction of CDS protection can thus 
tighten credit constraints and ultimately lead to a break-down of the credit market. Arping 
discusses several contract and policy levers that can prevent such a break-down, including 
disclosure requirements for CDS trades. Critically, his model shows that the benefits of 
financial innovation vary across borrowers with different characteristics; firms with low asset 
tangibility and where debt renegotiation is thus more cumbersome stand to benefit more from 
the use of CDS.  
 
Another tool for credit risk management is the securitization of loans. While the pooling and 
sale of loans by financial institutions has a long history, the amounts involved in this market 
exploded in the years leading up to the Global Financial Crisis (reaching $10.24 trillion in the 
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United States and $2.25 trillion in Europe as of the 2nd quarter of 2008)1 and, as already 
discussed, the securitization of sub-prime loans is often quoted as a critical factor in the 
boom-bust cycle of the 2000s in the U.S.  Critics point to incentive distortions caused by 
securitization, resulting in lower origination standards and quality of monitoring.  Using a 
model where banks play an active role in monitoring borrowers, Cerasi and Rochet (2013) 
analyze the impact of securitization on bankers' incentives across different macroeconomic 
scenarios.  They show that securitization can be part of the optimal financing scheme for 
banks, provided banks retain an equity tranche in the sold loans to maintain proper incentives. 
In economic downturns, however, securitization should be restricted. The implementation of 
the optimal solvency scheme is achieved by setting appropriate capital charges through a 
form of capital insurance, protecting the value of bank capital in downturns, while providing 
additional liquidity in upturns. The critical policy take away from their analysis is thus that 
securitization should be regulated differently across the business cycle.  
 
One critical issue in securitization has been whether lenders should be forced to retain an 
economic interest in the securitized assets.  The lack of proper screening and monitoring by 
lenders in the run-up to the Global Financial Crisis has often been explained with the fact that 
lenders did not retain any interest.  Current regulatory reform suggestions therefore include 
regulations to force issuers to retain an economic interest in the securitization products they 
issue. Specifically, legislation on securitizations in the EU and the U.S. will require arrangers 
of securitizations to hold 5% of the securitizations they sell. However, it is not only the size 
of retained exposure, but also the risk profile that matters as shown by Kisser and Kiff 
(2013).  The authors compare the retention of equity and mezzanine tranches and show that 
loan screening activity is maximized when the loan originating bank retains the equity 
tranche. However, in case capital structure irrelevance does not hold, resulting in a wedge 
between the cost of equity and debt, a profit maximizing bank is likely to favor retention of 
the less risky mezzanine tranche. From a regulator's perspective this is a problem because the 
                                                          
1
 Data are from the ESF Securitization Data Report Q2. 
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implied loan screening activity is substantially lower in this case. The wedge between banks’ 
and regulator’s incentives is even wider the costlier the due diligence, the higher the loan 
profitability, and the more positive the economic outlook.   
 
In summary, these three papers show that financial innovation, including CDS and 
securitization, is a double-edged sword, with important benefits for both banks and 
borrowers, but also distorting incentives of lenders, which can ultimately result in financial 
fragility. Smart and dynamic regulation of these forms of innovation is called for.   
 
3. Finance, globalization, and the real economy  
A large and by now well established literature has shown the critical importance of the 
financial system for economic growth. What started with simple cross-country regressions, as 
used by King and Levine (1993), has developed into a large literature using an array of 
different techniques to look beyond correlation and controlling for biases arising from 
endogeneity and omitted variables. Specifically, using instrumental variable approaches, 
difference-in-difference approaches that consider the differential impact of finance on 
specific sectors and thus point to a smoking gun, explorations of specific regulatory changes 
that led to financial deepening in individual countries, and micro- level approaches using 
firm-level data have provided the same result: financial deepening is a critical part of the 
overall development process of a country (see Levine, 2005 for an overview).  
 
More recent research, however, has pointed to important non-linearities in the relationship 
between finance and growth. There is evidence that the effect of financial development is 
strongest among middle-income countries, whereas other work finds a declining effect of 
finance and growth as countries grow richer.2 More recently, Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza 
(2012) find that the finance and growth relationship turns negative for high-income countries, 
identifying a value of 110 percent private credit to GDP as an approximate turning point, with 
                                                          
2
 Rioja and Valev (2004a, 2004b), andAghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), and Philippon and Reshef 
(2013). 
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the negative relationship between finance and growth turning significant at around 150 
percent private credit to GDP, levels reached by some high-income countries in the 2000s. 
Notably, most of these countries were hit hardest by the Global Financial Crisis.  
 
There are several not exclusive explanations for such non-linearities as put forward by the 
recent literature and partly informed by the recent crisis. First, the Lucas critique might apply 
to standard measures of financial development, in the sense that turning this indicator into a 
policy variable distorts and ultimately eliminates the relationship between finance and 
growth.  Second, the measures of financial depth and intermediation the literature has been 
using might be simply too crude to capture quality improvements at high levels of financial 
development. In addition, the financial sector has gradually extended its scope beyond the 
traditional activity of intermediation towards so-called “non-intermediation” financial 
activities (Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). As a result, the usual measures of 
intermediation services have become less and less congruent with the reality of modern 
financial systems. Third, some argue that the reason for the non-linearity of the finance-
growth relationship might be that financial development helps catch up to the productivity 
frontier, but has limited or no growth effect for countries that are close or at the frontier 
(Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005). We would thus not expect any growth effect 
from further financial deepening in high-income countries.   A fourth reason for non-
linearities might lie in the beneficiary of the credit as argued by Beck et al. (2012), who 
explore the differential growth effects of enterprise and household credit. Consistent with 
theory they find that the growth effect of financial deepening comes through enterprise rather 
than household credit.  Most of the financial deepening in high-income countries has come 
through additional household lending, which thus might explain the insignificant finance-
growth relationship across high-income countries. Fifth, the financial system might actually 
grow too large relative to the real economy if it extracts excessively high informational rents 
and in this way attracts too much young talent towards the financial industry (Bolton, Santos 
and Scheinkman, 2011; Philippon, 2010). 
 
10 
 
Beck, Degryse and Kneer (2013) offer another reason for a non-linear if not even negative 
relationship between finance and growth in high-income countries. Specifically, they explore 
empirically two different concepts of the financial system – the financial system as facilitator 
for the rest of the economy versus the financial system as a growth sector in itself, which also 
performs non-intermediation activities – and their relationship with GDP per capita growth 
and volatility. Based on a sample of 77 countries for the period 1980-2007, they find that 
intermediation activities increase growth and reduce volatility in the long run. An expansion 
of the financial sectors along other dimensions has no long-run effect on real sector 
outcomes. Over shorter time horizons a large financial sector stimulates growth at the cost of 
higher volatility in high-income countries. Notwithstanding, intermediation activities stabilize 
the economy in the medium run especially in low-income countries and enhance growth in 
the long-run in these countries. While the authors’ analysis is tentative and does not address 
issues of endogeneity, it adds to the on-going debate on the role of the financial system in 
post-crisis economies on both sides of the Atlantic.  
 
Another important and related debate is that on globalization of financial services. 
Economists and policymakers alike have for a long time debated the benefits and risks of 
financial globalization. The experience of the Global Financial Crisis has further added to this 
debate. Advocates of financial integration stress the benefits, including access to additional 
external resources available for capital-poor developing countries and improvements in 
resource allocation and risk-sharing possibilities (Fischer, 1998; Summer, 2000). Critics point 
to the volatility of capital flows, which ultimately undermines financial and economic 
stability on the national and global level (Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002). The empirical 
evidence has not provided unambiguous evidence.   On the one hand, several cross-country 
studies (e.g., Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2005, Quinn and Toyoda, 2008 and Henry, 
2000) have documented a positive relationship between financial openness and growth. On 
the other hand, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) find no significant relationship. One of the 
reasons for these contradicting findings relates to different measures of financial openness 
used as well as different methodologies. There are also contradictory findings on the 
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relationship between openness/globalization and volatility. Popov (2011) finds a positive 
effect of financial integration on growth volatility, while Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad 
(2006) find a negative relationship.  
 
Di Nicolo and Juvenal (2013) distinguish between financial integration and globalization, 
where the former is defined as how close a financial market excess returns are to an equally 
weighted global market excess return, whereas the latter is captured by a measure in the 
growth of external assets and liabilities relative to GDP, and examine their respective impact 
on several dimensions of real activity.  Using data for 48 advanced and emerging market 
economies during 1985-2009, the authors show that both advances in financial integration 
and globalization are associated with higher growth, lower growth volatility, and lower 
probabilities of severe declines in real activity, with the positive impact of financial 
integration enhanced by improvements in corporate governance. They thus find no evidence 
of a trade-off between advances in financial integration, globalization, and macroeconomic 
stability. 
 
In summary, the empirical evidence of these two and related papers underlines the 
importance of financial intermediation and integration for real sector outcomes. This line of 
research has also shown, however, that different concepts of financial intermediation and 
integration and the corresponding measurements can imply different relationships with the 
real economy.  It has also become increasingly clear that there are important interaction 
effects between financial development and financial integration, with financial integration 
fostering the development of a domestic financial system – one of the collateral benefits 
stressed by Kose et al. (2009) – while a well developed financial system is at the same time a 
pre-condition for an economy to benefit from financial integration (Alfaro et al., 2004).   
 
4. The Role of the Government 
The recent crises have also put the role of government at the center of the debate. While there 
has been a growing “pro-market” consensus before the crisis that governments should focus 
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on providing the necessary legal and regulatory frameworks for financial institutions and 
markets to flourish, the experience of the crisis, with governments nationalizing failing banks 
and providing widespread guarantees, has reopened the possibility of much more activist 
governments. 
  
A previous special issue of the Journal of Financial Stability has addressed the issue of partial 
credit guarantees (Volume 6, issue 1, 2010). As documented by Beck, Klapper and Mendoza 
(2010), such schemes are widespread across the developing and developed world, although 
there is little rigorous evidence yet on their effectiveness in deepening financial systems and 
in their optimal design.  In this special issue, Anginer, de la Torre and Ize (2013) analyze 
different justifications for the government to step into the market and offer such credit 
guarantee schemes. They first dismiss several common justifications, including principal-
agent frictions or un-internalized externalities in an environment of risk neutrality. On the 
other hand, where risk is purely idiosyncratic—and thus in principle diversifiable in the 
market—government guarantees can be justified if private lenders are risk averse and because 
of the state's comparative advantage over markets in resolving the collective action frictions 
that hinder risk spreading.   To exploit this advantage in a sustainable manner, however, the 
providers of such guarantee schemes, typically development banks or agencies, have to price 
their guarantees fairly, crowd in the private sector, and reduce their excessive risk aversion. 
This in return requires addressing governance deficiencies present in many development 
banks around the globe, as well as addressing challenges of risk management.  
 
Credit guarantees are obviously only one, though very important, area of engagement for 
activist governments. By moving beyond macroeconomic management and providing the 
institutional and regulatory framework for financial institutions and markets towards 
providing services and products that could be – in principle – provided by the market, 
governments move onto “thin ice”. On the one hand, ample experience across the developing 
and the developed world has shown that governments more often fail than succeed in 
providing financial services in a sustainable manner; on the other hand, market failures as 
13 
 
discussed above create space for a positive role for governments in building markets. Put 
differently, the risk of government failure on the one side and market failure on the other side 
provide only a small opening for the ship of government interventions into the financial 
system to sail through successfully.3   
 
5. Looking forward 
The recent crisis has raised substantial questions about the role of finance in modern market 
economies.  This special issue includes six papers that address several fundamental issues in 
financial development and innovation and speak to the on-going regulatory reform debate. 
They show the benefits and risks of financial innovation and the importance of financial 
intermediation and globalization for real sector outcomes and discuss the role of government.      
 
In this concluding section, I provide several thoughts on the research agenda going forward. 
Specifically, I would like to focus on five areas of policy relevant research.  First, what is the 
optimal size and structure of the financial system? Given recent evidence that financial sector 
deepening might actually have a negative effect on growth beyond a certain threshold and the 
evidence of fragility risks stemming from rapidly expanding financial systems, determining 
the “Goldilocks” level and structure of financial system is a first-order question for policy 
makers in both developed and developing economies. This question relates both to 
benchmarking exercises that relate the level and growth in financial depth indicators across 
countries to a synthetic benchmark as to the banking crisis prediction literature (Barajas et al., 
2013; Dell’Arriccia et al., 2012b).  This question also relates to structure of financial system, 
i.e., the prominence of banks, capital markets, contractual savings institutions, and non-
regulated shadow banks within a financial system, as to the interaction of these different 
segments. Is there an optimal structure in terms of the relative importance of these different 
segments, in terms of both growth and stability benefits? Is there an optimal degree of 
integration between banks and markets and an optimal degree of risk transformation through 
                                                          
3
 See de la Torre, Gozzi and Schmukler (2006) for examples of such activist government intervention to address 
market failures in Latin America.  
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the financial system? Can the financial system expand to a size where it turns into a drag onto 
the real economy by pulling out talent and resources? These are very policy relevant 
questions, as they relate to the question of activity restrictions imposed on banks, as recently 
suggested by the Vickers and Liikanen Commissions and implemented through the Volcker 
rule. This debate also relates to the question whether taxation or other policy levers should be 
used to prevent the financial system from expanding too rapidly.  
 
A second question relates to the optimal design of regulatory and supervisory systems and 
their interaction with the governance of financial institutions.  While the effect of individual 
regulatory reforms has been explored, including the effects of capital and liquidity 
requirements, security market taxation, compensation policies, and governance structures (see 
Allen, Beck and Carletti, 2013 for an overview), their interaction has been less of a focus. 
There might be important interaction effects of changes in different regulatory policies, 
however.  As shown by Laeven and Levine (2009), for example, the effect of higher capital 
requirements can have different effect on banks’ risk taking, depending on the ownership 
structure of banks. Beck, de Jonghe and Schepens (2013) show that regulatory reforms have 
an important impact on the relationship between bank competition and stability.  Regulatory 
reforms might therefore have different effects across countries depending on the structure of 
the financial system and the overall regulatory and supervisory structure. Institutional 
structures are another important issue, i.e., the debate on whether responsibilities for 
regulation and supervision should be housed at the central bank and whether there should be 
a unified regulator or specialized regulators for different segments of the financial system has 
been revived by the crisis (see Ioannidou, 2005; Boyer and Ponce, 2012). Finally, which 
institutions and markets should be within and outside the regulatory perimeter?  Can the 
financial safety net be restricted to institutions inside this perimeter?    
 
Third, the issue of financial integration and globalization needs further attention.  While there 
is increasing evidence – as also presented in this special issue – of their benefits, the recent 
crisis has clearly shown that integration to global financial markets exposes economies to 
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contagion risks.  One specific area, for which this has been documented, is cross-border 
banking.   Among others, Popov and Udell (2012) and de Haas and Lelyveld (2014) show 
that foreign banks have propagated shocks from their home into host countries, while 
Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Perri (2013) show that financial shocks such as the Global 
Financial Crisis lead to a synchronization of business cycles across countries.  On the other 
hand, there is also evidence that cross-border banking has positive effects for host economies, 
in terms of financial deepening and in mitigating the impact of local economic shocks 
(Claessens and van Horen, 2014; de Haas and Lelyveld, 2014)    The question is therefore not 
so much on whether to limit or expand financial integration, but how to harness its benefits.  
This refers both to macroeconomic management of capital flows as to cross-border 
cooperation on bank regulation and supervision.  It raises the issue of macroprudential 
regulation as an additional prudential tool, as well as how to move international cooperation 
on the supervision of large multi-national banks beyond memorandums of understanding and 
colleges of supervisors, which have shown their limited usefulness during the crisis (Beck 
and Wagner, 2013). 
 
Fourth, the global financial crisis has resulted in a spur of theoretical and empirical research 
on financial innovation. Given that derivatives, such as CDS and CDOs, were at the core of 
the crisis and given on-going discussion on how to regulate financial innovation, more 
research in this area, both on the bank- and client-level, but also on the aggregate level, is 
called for. Gauging financial innovation’s effects on both the real economy (with potential 
benefits but also potential costs) and the repercussions of new products and securities for 
stability or fragility of individual financial institutions or the whole banking or financial 
system is important.  Beyond establishing the benefits and risks of financial innovation, it is 
important to also understand the optimal regulatory response to such innovation. Given the 
dynamic character of financial innovation, this will most likely require a constant adaptation 
of regulations.  As a final remark, let me say that financial innovation should be understood 
very broadly. While the focus in developed countries has been on derivatives and trading 
mechanisms, financial innovation in developing countries takes the form of new financial 
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products for previously unbanked population segments (e.g., transaction accounts, 
commitment savings product and rainfall insurance) and new delivery channels to reach out 
these segments (e.g., agency banking and mobile phone banking).  
 
A final area of future policy relevant research is the role of government in the financial 
system and the interaction between politics and finance. While the pre-crisis consensus was 
one of minimal government interference in the financial system and of reliance on markets, 
market participants, and self-regulation, the crisis has reminded us of the importance of 
market failures in finance.  However, experience from both developed and developing 
markets has shown that government officials are rarely competent bankers and financiers and 
that governments rarely maximize social welfare but rather represent the interests of their 
electorates or special interest groups. There is thus a fine line between the necessary role of 
the government as arbiter and provider of the basic financial infrastructure and the 
government as interested party and possibly even player in the financial system. 
Understanding the politics of financial sector reform and designing safeguards against 
political interference and political capture in the financial system is thus critical.  
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